A new policy tool for farms that aims to create a new market for ecosystem services provided by agriculture has been analysed. We quantify the potential regional supply curve of ecosystem services, using as a proxy the amount of carbon that could be sequestered with permanent grassland. A minimum data approach has been applied to integrate the spatial heterogeneity of the agrosystems with economic parameter collected through FADN in a case study area (Veneto, Italy). The simulation allows comparing three policy tools (agrienvironment payment, regulatory standard and tradable permit). Results suggest that tradable permits (floor and trade) could be more efficient than policy based on direct payments or mandatory standards, although the largest provision of ecosystem service (carbon sequestered) has been achieved with mandatory mechanism.
Introduction
The identification of policy measures with a good level of cost effectiveness has become a priority issue in the debate on future scenarios for agriculture and rural development. Within the framework of agri-environmental policies, several analysis and proposals have tried to identify new tools to ensure the provision of environmental goods and services at reasonable cost to society as a whole. In short the actions proposed, other than regulatory standards, are: 1) proportionate incentives to achieve measurable environmental results, 2) provide access to farmers who provide greater environmental outcome, or that require less compensation for the same environmental objective, 3) to apply additional taxes on the use of potentially polluting products, 4) to create new markets through tradable permits (Cooper et al., 2009 , RISE, 2009 ). The latter tool seems to find increasing interest among stakeholders and policy makers due to the potential for more effective provision of public goods, taking into account the different level of profitability of various farm typologies. On the other hand there are often limitations to their use, mainly due to the administrative burdens resulting from the large number of farms involved. Although these limitations could arise the private costs, it seems of interest analysing the overall cost effectiveness of these new market-based instruments in comparison with more traditional policies, such as regulation and agrienvironment payments.
In this paper we examine the likely general implications that might result from the implementation of different policy mechanisms designed to promote the production of ecosystem service in a case study area (Veneto region in Italy). The analysis uses the amount of carbon sequestered from the atmosphere through less intensive farming systems, as a proxy for ecosystem services, such as hay meadows and grazing land (MG) in comparison to more intensive arable cropping systems (AC). Meadows and grazing systems represent the most extensive form of forage farming and they are often confined to areas not well suited to other agricultural land uses or where are emphasize the environmental and landscape aspects. The MG play important ecological roles linked to the fact that they are dynamic and complex natural systems and reach a high degree of biodiversity (many species of plants living in balance with the mineral substrate). In particular, these systems are characterized by their ability to sequester atmospheric CO 2 and store it directly in soil. As reported in the literature, the soil occupied by permanent forage systems in Europe shows a positive average estimated annual value of 0.52 tons of carbon stored per hectare, compared with the negative value of -0.84 tC/ha -1 y -1 in intensive arable lands (Vleeshouwers and Verhagen, 2002) 1 . In recent years in Italy the meadows and grazing land did not decrease thanks to the decoupling mechanism and the trend of the pre-reform period to cultivate arable crops in order to receive direct payments has been slowed down. Moreover, the gradual intensification of crop production that promotes a greater potential forage respect to the MG systems remains a latent threat. In fact, in the most fertile plains is becoming very rare to find MG, which are concentrated in marginal areas and have no alternative economically profitable, such as mountain (Povellato, 2010) 2 . But what could be the potential impact in Italy due to the implementation of two different policy measures such as: 1) payments for ecosystem services or 2) introduction of ecological priority areas? In order to answer this question we estimated the possible land area affected by the introduction of these two policy measures starting from the FADN database and restricting the analysis in Veneto region.
The paper is divided into two main sections, the first analyze the potential regional supply curves of carbon sequestered in the hypothesis that all regional farms are oblige to allocate a minimum farmland to meadows and grazing, with a specific direct payment. In the second section, it is assumed that the obligation to allocate farmland to meadows and grazing, regards only farms that do not reach a minimum threshold, with the possibility to activate or not mechanisms of tradable permits.
The minimum data approach and the supply of ecosystem services
The "ecosystem services" (ES) has defined as the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystem, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human life (Daily 1997) . The Millennium Ecosystem assessment has classified the ES in four categories: provisioning, supporting, cultural and regulating services (Zhang et al., 2007) . Examples of ecosystem services could be the detoxification of harmful molecules (e.g. phytoremediation), the air and water purification, soil fertility, climate mitigation, natural pest control, etc… (Salzman et al. 2001) . Agriculture can be an activity that produces ecosystem services, particularly for direct action that has the use of land resource (Antle, 2007) . From this point of view the ES are public goods, justifying public policy aimed at increasing their production. In purely theoretical line, an efficient agri-environmental policy should be directed to increase the amount of ecosystem services, trying not to foreclose the agricultural production, by imposing changes on farming practices. The total suppression of the production, in fact, maximize the value of the resource only if the marginal reduction in the value of ecosystem services is so great as to offset the loss in the market for products (Antle, 2007) . Finally, another interesting aspect to an efficient policy should take into account the spatial heterogeneity, because the ES are site-specific and are linked at peculiar features such as land, climate, distance to market, etc.
1 These values are based on the results obtained by applying the simulation model CESAR (Carbon Emission and Sequestration by Agricultural Land Use) developed in Vleeshouwers and Verhagen (2002) . The model is based on a system of carbon balance, which computes in addition to the inputs of carbon in plant biomass due to photosintetic process, also output of organic matter accumulated in the soil in quantities related to site-specific soil and weather conditions. 2 According to the latest Farm Structure Survey of 2007, in Italy the areas of meadows and grazing land are concentrated at 86% of the total UAA in mountainous and hilly areas. In the plains meadows and grazing land represented only 7% of the total Agricultural Area, with a clear trend to decline in recent years. In general, MG lands are in farming with livestock or land public bodies (including municipalities and mountain communities), which lease these areas to farm for a few months a year (INEA, 2009; Povellato, 2010) .
In this first step we consider the supply of ecosystem services provided from agriculture related at the amount of atmospheric carbon sequestered in agricultural soils, considering that this service is a function of various parameters site-specific, as well as soil type and vegetation cover, cultivation practices exercised, topography, history of land use, microclimate, etc. We assume that, given two alternative cropping systems -intensive arable crops (AC) and meadows and grazing systems (MG) -, the transition from one system to another implies the increase of the amount of carbon stored in soils. More precisely in case of MG, the carbon sequestered is significantly greater than that of intensive arable land 3 . Antle and Valdivia (2006) have introduced an interesting and simple method to estimate the approximate value of the expected supply of ecosystem service provided by agriculture. More precisely, the authors propose a minimum data approach (MDA), which calculates the supply of ES in a given region by combination of site-specific biophysical aspects with more general information on economic aspects of agricultural systems. We consider that each production system allocates a specific production of ES, and we assume that increase in ES supply involves the conversion toward most eco-efficient system, implying a specific opportunity cost for each management choice. From the spatial distribution of these opportunity costs will then be possible to derive the expected supply of ES. In this paper we try to apply an empirical analysis based on the MDA described in Antle and Valdivia (2006) and developed in several other recent works Noalukenge et al. 2009; Stoorvogel et al. 2009; Antle et al. 2010) .
We will estimate the potential supply of carbon sequestered in the Veneto region. The approach is based on a static analysis that estimates the proportion of farmers responding positively to incentives in terms of hectares converted to MG from AC, under an initial mandatory thresholds of surface (e.g. 5% of total agricultural area) and in presence of an increased incentives 4 . In the initial situation the choice whether cultivates AC or MG depends on profitability of alternative land uses. For simplicity in this step we assume that there is no additional cost to switch from one to another farming system 5 . On this basis the farmer will choose the AC or MG systems as a function of return per unit (e.g., gross incomes per hectare). The rising of the ecosystem services supply can lead to important changes on agricultural productivity with direct impacts on farmer's income. In these cases, the absence of policies that provide specific incentives would encourage the provision of ES only by farms that find profitable farming MG (e.g. livestock farms). The share of ecosystem services is thus associated with the provision of market goods and does not take into account the assessment by the society. This situation characterizes a "private equilibrium" of ES supply and only an appropriate intervention (e.g. payments offered to farmers) could allow its reconfiguration in order to increase the ecosystem services (Nalukenge et al., 2009) 6 .
In analytical terms the private equilibrium is therefore based on maximizing expected profits expressed by where p is the vector of output prices, g is the geographic location and s is the index comparison of the agrosystems (i.e. s 1 for intensive arable land and s 2 for meadows and grazing), and the management decision will be taken on the basis of opportunity cost for each farm considered In fact, if will be chosen to allocate land to AC, and vice versa to MG. By extending the analysis to all the farms in the regions spatially defined, which in the case study in question relate to the provincial areas of the Veneto, can be determined the spatial distribution function (density function) of the relative opportunity costs at a given price:
where is the share of land for private equilibrium in MG activity (Antle and Valdivia, 2006; Antle et al., 2010) . From this function can be derived the expected value of the overall regional supply of ES [S (p)] in a given period (one year in this case study) and in a given area of H hectares:
where represents the amount of carbon sequestered annually by the atmosphere and stored in agricultural soil when is occupied by meadows and grazing systems for each local situation considered 7 . Assuming now the existence of a measure that encourages farmers to increase the supply of ES, such as represented by the additional payment per unit of ES product ( ), a new equilibrium can be configure and the equation (1) becomes:
The (4) indicates that the choice of farmers to convert arable land to grassland occurs if and only if . Considering the spatial distribution of opportunity costs in the presence of specific incentives expressed as price will find that where represents the range of hectares of land allocated to MG when the opportunity cost is between zero and . The expected value of the supply of ES will be mechanism for providing the same services. The problem of spatial dependence also arises for opportunity costs when there are positive externalities such as learning associated with the adoption of alternative management practices. 7 For simplicity in this paper we assume that amount of carbon sequestered in different only to the type of land use and is constant throughout the region. The reference values are funded on the study by Vleeshouwers and Verhagen (2002) , which we refer for details.
which represents the total amount of ES corresponding to the range of incentives . The value of function is the sum of all units of service produced (tons of carbon sequestered) on the additional land units converted from intensive arable land to meadows and grazing systems. The properties of the curve are determined by the shape of the density function of opportunity costs and the quantity per unit of ecosystem services provided . In farming context, therefore, three cases may occur in the formation of ES supply: 1)
, so the allocation of MG area is preferred to AC without specific incentives, 2)
, AC are cheaper than MG and then the conversion of land use is only in the presence of an incentive, 3) and , AC are always cheaper than MG for the entire range of expected payments. Assuming a range of payments per unit of ES products, the analysis was repeated for each value derived from the corresponding expected values of land converted to MG and then potential supply of ecosystem services distinct in provincial zone. The slope of the curve obtained is positive, because for each specific increase in incentive there is an increase of farmers willingness to participate in such contracts, according to the technical potential of their land opportunity costs incurred (Antle and Stoorvogel, 2006) .
-The case study
The research was carried out starting from the knowledge of the average carbon fluxes for each farming systems and the opportunity costs derived from the difference between gross margin in both activities. The biophysical data on the flows of carbon sequestered by various land uses in Europe have been learned from the results of the CESAR model (Vleeshouwers and Verhagen, 2002; Freibauer et al., 2004; Sousanna et al., 2004) , while the economic information necessary to simulate the decisional model have been learned from the FADN sample for the Veneto region, making reference to the year 2007. More precisely the farms sample has been select according to altitude limit of the Veneto plain. The spatial dimension of reference has therefore been created by layering the sample on the basis of belonging to the province of farms creating six groups (Verona, Vicenza, Treviso, Venice, Padua and Rovigo) 8 . As mentioned, in order to limit the analysis to agricultural systems for herbaceous cropping systems to intensive arable land and grassland, the farms sampled include only those with utilised agricultural area (UAA) devoted to herbaceous crops. The systems considered were built on two macroaggregates. The first system (s 1 ) includes acreage for cereal, legumes, industrial crops, vegetables, flowers, alternated fodder and field crops in general 9 , while the second system s 2 is based on the UAA devoted to hay meadows (monophyta and polyphyta), permanent pasture and pasture-fallow production. For each macroaggregate we computed economic parameters, such as: the aggregate output for each activity, the quantities sold and the respective monetary values, the variable costs of management (including the expenditure items for seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, rental farm equipment, irrigation and other expenses), and reuse of farm output. Following some budget variables were determined to calculate the distribution of opportunity costs related to the sample (characterized by 540 observations) 10 . The variables are the average yields unit, the unit explicit costs, average prices and therefore 8 The province of Belluno has been excluded since have not lowland areas 9 Mushroom farms are excluded. 10 For more details on the formation and structure of the FADN data see Abitabile and Scardera (2008) . the overall gross income. Finally were weighted appropriately and extended to the entire population of regional farms considered 11 . The main assumption regards the requirement for all farms must have a sufficient area to permanent grassland managed according to criteria of good and sustainable agricultural practices. On this basis, in Veneto, limiting the analysis only to the agricultural land devoted to herbaceous crops in lowland, 91% of the farms do not have permanent forage crops, while about 9% have meadows and grazing systems. The farms that adopt MG in their land use plan devote a large share of the UAA, due to the presence of livestock breeding.
-Payments for ecosystem services
The MD approach has been implemented with the hypothesis of a 5% increase of UAA allocated to MG. The knowledge of the unit values of costs and average yields has allowed us to revise the gross incomes on new configurations of crops and then the opportunity costs calculated as the difference between the first and second system. As explained above, the profitability of two systems can be given by the difference of opportunity cost, which are heterogeneous and spatially explicit.
In this step we estimated the opportunity costs, determining the associated spatial distributions function (density function) and the spatial distribution of opportunity cost per unit of ecosystem service (tons of carbon sequestered) in Veneto region. From this distribution function we derived the potential supply of land convertible to MG systems expressed in terms of the range of payments per unit of carbon stored in soil. The sensitivity analysis was conducted based on the threshold of payment ranging from 50 to 350 €/t of carbon, with intermediate steps of 50 €/t. The results show that in the baseline case (without incentives) in Veneto is really negligible the rate of farms that find profitable switching the producing system at MG, which in terms of surface means little more than 4,000 hectares. In presence of a policy based on payments per unit of ES provided, the amount of UAA converted to MG increases. Assuming maximum ecosystem service price of 350 € /t, reaches almost 25,000 hectares with an increase from baseline of 480% (Figure 1 ). At level of the six selected provinces, the results highlight some very interesting variations, due to the strong spatial heterogeneity discussed above. 
The floor-and-trade mechanism
Among the tradable permits instruments the floor-and-trade (FT) mechanism has been proposed for the first time by the Country Land and Business Association (CLA, 2009 , RISE 2009 . Given a minimum quantity of environmental goods that must be provided by each farm, through the assignment of obligations to ensure the sustainability of farming, the FT mechanism allows each farm to provide the environmental good or to buy the share of environmental goods from other farms that have any surplus, according to their convenience. These environmental goods are currently provided meagerly and perceived as scarcest and needful from the society. The "minimum quantity" of these goods could take the form of a share of the agricultural area devoted to permanent grassland, hedges or a certain amount of CO 2 stored in soil or biomass.
On this basis, implementing the FT mechanism, each farm would be free to decide whether to directly provide the good environment (MG land) or to buy that share of public goods from other farms that have a surplus if the other land-uses for productive activities are more profitable. The introduction of this obligation associated with the possibility of trading with other farms creates a new market for environmental goods that may be provided by agriculture. When the amount of a given environmental good available to a farm exceeds the required minimum amount (floor) a "credit" is generated that can be traded (trade) with farms that, under the intensive and specialized production, need to comply with the minimum requirement. The elasticity of the system respect to a mandatory requirement could allocate the production activity of environmental goods on the basis of their opportunity costs. So should be achieved, theoretically, a more efficient factor allocation.
This mechanism is similar at "cap-and-trade" measure provided in recent years for the emissions of greenhouse gases by some industrial sectors in Europe (Emission Trading System) that has been implemented since the seventies in the United States about air pollution act. To enable a market for tradable permits require the following minimum requisites: 1) there must be a surplus of tradable goods; 2) must be legally applicable; 3) must be permanent; 4) the environmental goods must be quantifiable (Tietemberg, 2004) . The measurability of the good subject to FT mechanism is particularly important for agricultural activity that has external effects (positive and negative) common and not easily quantifiable such as in industry. The quantification of the environmental good is given by the area occupied by these land uses, possibly related to comply with certain standards of management. An example of this type of obligation is the "ecological compensation areas" or "ecological priority area" introduced a few years in Switzerland as part of compliance. In this case the farmers are required to keep a rate of their land as ecological compensation areas as a condition to receive direct and ecological support payments (Cooper et al., 2009, p. 134) . Several European environmental associations have suggested that the ecological priority areas should be also included among the environmental standards that farmers must comply with EU countries (BirdLife, 2008) . Actually, it seems that there is a gradual recognition of the need to preserve natural habitats on farms by the European legislation. First, the meadows and grazing lands have been included since the EU regulation 1782/2003 of the compliance requirements, and confirmed with the reform of the Health Check. The article 6 of EU Regulation 73/2009 reaffirms the obligation to maintain at least the extension of MG in 2003. Moreover, among the mandatory requirements of compliance provided by the regulation, there is an obligation to maintain the "landscape features, including, where appropriate, hedges, ponds, ditches, trees in rows, in groups or isolated and margins fields" and one of the optional requirements has been included as the "creation and/or preservation of habitat". On this basis it might be reasonable to assume that environmental standards for biodiversity will have an increasingly important role, especially if it re-establishes the ecological network composed of semi-natural elements and areas under permanent grassland, which in recent decades have undergone a dramatic reduction in Italy as happened as in other areas of Western Europe (Farmer et al., 2008) .
Considering the need to increase the supply of ecosystem services provided by agriculture, we could envisage an obligation for each farm to identify "areas of ecological priorities" at least equivalent to a minimum percentage of UAA (e.g. 5% or 10%). In these cases, the FT mechanism could be used, even temporarily, to allow at farmers to identify the most appropriate solution in terms of land allocation and to ensure that this obligation would not affect too much the farm income. The definition of the threshold values is crucial not only to create the conditions for the exchange of permits, but also in terms of cost effectiveness of the measure. In fact, the increase in costs (private) incurred by the farmers -both in cases of direct application to the purchase of credits -it should take account of (social) environmental benefits achieved in rural areas. The measurement of these benefits opens up a scenario where the environmental economist are questioning a long time giving rise to interesting and controversial discussions on the theme of climate change, beginning with the Stern Review (2007), and more recently also in terms of biodiversity (TEEB, 2009) .
Another rather important aspect in the choice of a mechanism for applying FT covers the area within which it is possible trade credits. As already noted in the case of cap-and-trade applied to specific cases of pollution, farms located in protected areas or high nature value areas should not be allowed of being able to compensate for the lack of "ecosystem services credits" with other farms that are outside of these areas. Equally important is the choice of the size of areas that, if very large may allow substantial re-allotments (mountain areas with the most credits could easily offset the more intensive lowland areas), while a greater segmentation would lead to a better distribution of ecosystem services (e.g. a certain threshold must be met within the lowland areas). These last two examples are not neutral in terms of environmental effects achieved and therefore the effects on environmental quality of areas should be carefully considered.
Finally, from an economic point of view, in the presence of a mechanism of FT, a farm decides to fulfil the mandatory only if the difference between the loss of traditional agricultural production income and the opportunity cost of maintaining these ecological priority areas is lower of the cost it would incur in order to acquire this ecosystem service from other farms. Since the ecological priority areas cover a very limited area, it should be assumed that there are no large structural changes and then there is no change in fixed costs. This leads us to believe that the gross income is the most appropriate variable. In other words, if there is convenience to purchase credits, the gross income from the crop minus the cost of buying credit from another farm must be greater than the difference between revenues and maintenance cost of ecological priority areas in their own farm.
-The potential impact of ecological priority areas in Veneto
Starting from the FADN data used in the earlier analysis, in this second step we will investigate the impact that the introduction of the other policy measures, the ecological priority areas, under two different policy mechanisms: the mandatory approach and the floorand-trade approach. The first scenario is the FT mechanism that provides the possibility to enable a market of tradable permits of ES, as introduced, which refer to minimal surfaces of meadows and grazing. The second scenario, instead regards the implementation of a simple obligation to change land use towards MG systems. The simulation assumes three minimum threshold of MG land required in each farm. We define two alternative scenarios to the baseline.
Minimum farm threshold of UAA at MG First scenario Second scenario

5%
Floor-and-trade (FT) Mandatory 10% 15%
As shown in Table 1 in Veneto on a current utilised agricultural area allocated to arable crops of about 545.260 ha, only 6% is occupied by MG (32.715 ha). This, in general terms means that in the case of FT (as well as mandatory) and a mandatory minimum area of 5% of UAA in MG there is a problem purely redistributive respect to the case of a larger percentage (10% or 15%), where a new allocation is need that provide the conversion in MG for arable land. For this reason we presented the three different thresholds for the two scenarios. Therefore, if the requirements were introduced in permanent grassland cultivation, say 5%, 10% and 15%, respectively, shows the need to convert about 24.000, 48.000 and 72.000 hectares to MG or to request a corresponding proportion of credits.
This simple framework shows that the instrument of floor-and-trade has some peculiarities that make it attractive in a potential regional introduction, in order to make it less expensive and more acceptable to the transition of farming systems to a greater degree of sustainability.
The purpose of our investigation is to distinguish the convenience of farmers to selfproduce MG or directly contact the allowance market. The analysis started substantially from the definition of opportunity costs, in turn accounted for by differences in performance of individual cropping systems in line with what has been seen in the previous section. Moreover, in this case we take into account the transaction costs. Therefore, the choice to allocate land will be given as a function of the individual gross income, transaction costs and minimum thresholds.
where Ha are the hectares allocated to MG, while KT and Tr are respectively the transaction costs and the minimum threshold (floor). For the first scenario, the computation of Ha is quite simple because it is basically to redistribute the land uses in order to optimize the presence of MG for each farm based on individual economic advantages. On this basis, the farms differ in surplus of MG surface (> 5% UAA) from those in deficit. The latter may decide to convert part of its surface in MG if their opportunity cost is less transaction costs (OC < KT), otherwise find it profitable to address the market shares of MG (trade). On the other hand, farmes that have potential credit are those that have an area allocated to MG 5% higher, and therefore may decide to "sell" on the market. In economic terms, the implementation of the FT will affect the final income on the basis of any credit/debts. The debts (DEBT) are quantized by a deficiency of land for the transaction costs per unit, while the credits (CREDIT) are given by the surplus shore for unit transaction costs, and related to the amount of effective debts, net of farms that decide to selfproduce. Analytically the balance equation is then given by where GI is the gross final income, are the returns for each farm unit (s) and their relative share of land (h). In the alternative scenario, the situation is much easier because there will be only a mandatory reallocation for farms in deficit of MG, followed by adjustments of gross income. In the second and third case in which the units arrive at the floor of 10% and 15% the situation is complicated because in the presence of FT the problem is not only primarily redistributive, but also implies the need for a proper reconfiguration of the scheme allocation of land use. Even in this case the choice of farmers to allocate land to MG can be represented by (7), and they express the opinions of convenience to self-produce or to buy permits on the market. In our survey the farms were separate from those in deficit and surplus of MG according to their mandatory share (floor), while the convenience to convert the land uses or buy (sell) permits was evaluated on the basis of cost minimisation.
In order to characterize the opportunity cost to produce intensive crops or meadows and grazing in the presence of FT, and identify the point of equilibrium between farms in effective debit (ie non convenience to self-produce) and in credit, we determined the land cumulative distribution functions and then we compared for both cases (Figures 2 and 3) . Thus was established a sort of "equilibrium price" ( ) 12 given by the break-even point between the unitary opportunity costs to choose one or the other system in the case of farms that are in surplus or deficit of MG. The break-even point allows to identify the price at which it could become profitable for farms in debit (credit) to buy (sell) permits of use in MG in the presence of FT. According to this scheme the surface due allocable subject to exchange (trade) is the difference between the obligation required (floor) and the requirements needed to satisfy by the reallocation "intrafarm" because the opportunity cost is less than or equal to the equilibrium price.
With regard to effective credit land, there may be two situations. The first where the opportunity cost is less than or equal to the equalize price, so should allocate all the farmland in MG, while the second, when the price is higher than the break-even opportunity cost, agrees to sell only the MG surplus. Under the new farmland configuration derived from this reasoning, we have determined the economic performance in terms of gross income by applying (8) 13 . At the end of each data processing (per scenario and per threshold), the amount of carbon sequestered was computed, according to the coefficient explained in the previous paragraph. 12 Based on the results of this analysis, the equalize prices are respectively of 490 € / ha in the case of FT to 10% and 750 € / ha in the case of 15%. 13 In this case the relative amount of debt and credit were quantified according to the costs of transition and equalize price. More specifically, the share of total debt is given on the bases by the reallocation intrafarm:
; and from debt share that can be filled only by permits market, because reallocation is less profitable:
. Similarly for the credit, their proportion includes both those already available within the farm: ; and the potential credit determined by the farmland not allocated to MG but could agree, . Table 2 shows the main results of the simulations. We observe that in the case of FT scenario changes in income for the farms in debit are relatively low (-2.7% as maximum), while the situation for those in credit could bring significant improvements in income gains estimated between 8% and 15% respectively for the second and third case (10% and 15%). With the mandatory scenario the losses are more substantial, though limited and less than 10%. This outcome confirms that the introduction of tradable-permits-based measures, as floor-and-trade mechanism, are innovative tools designed to emphasize the agricultural production of ES, but at the same time guaranteeing the income of farms in this way and seeking "win win" solution. The situation changes when we consider the amount of ES provided (table 3) . In fact, if the threshold of 5% of UAA leads to an improvement estimated at +8% of sequestered C in mandatory scenario, in the FT scenario is just 1%. With the threshold to 10% of UAA, the carbon sequestered in mandatory case attains 16%, while is only 7% with the FT mechanism. The increase to 15% of UAA results in an improvement of up to 24% for the second scenario, compared with 16% in the first. -15 - 
Concluding remarks
The ecosystem services, provided from agriculture and classified by the recent Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, depend in turn upon a web of supporting and regulating inputs to production (e.g., soil fertility and pollination). Agriculture also receives ecosystem dis-services that reduce productivity or increase production costs. Managing agricultural in a way to provide sufficient supporting and regulating ecosystem services and fewer dis-services will require multidisciplinary and collaborative research (Zhang et al. 2007) . In this paper we have analysed how ecosystem services can be managed across a particular form of tradable permits, the floor-and-trade mechanism, and we noted that this policy are more efficient and effective than policy based on direct payments or direct mandatory. We have found that a more efficient mechanism is based on tradable permits, because this mechanism propose a win-win solution, observing both interest of farmers and society, although the largest provision of ecosystem service (carbon sequestered) has been achieved with mandatory mechanism.
The overall results show that, even without payments (first step), a certain percentage of the farmers already adopt unknowingly the practices more eco-efficient, providing certain ecosystem service. The key question that remains is the assessment of proper transaction and adoption costs . These costs may have a significant impact on the interpretation of the results and we tried a possible accounting (second step). In FT scenario, farmers that attain low opportunity costs have an incentive to provide ES because they can sell the resulting permits on the market, while farmers on which MG activity is expensive have an incentive to maintain alternative and intensive cropping systems and may prefer buying permits for compensation. Hence, in principle, permit markets provide an incentive for landowners to use their land in such a way that a cost-effective allocation of land-use types emerges. In fact, because carbon can only be released if carbon of equivalent value is stored, the ecological effectiveness of the instrument is ensured. There are many potentialities from FT system. In fact the supply of permits may come from private farmers but also from state authorities and conservation groups that owned agricultural land. Ecological consultancies may also buy land to dedicate providing ecosystem services or cooperate with other farmers (Wissel and Watzold, 2010) .
The starting point of the case study is the spatial distribution of opportunity costs, the ecosystem services measured with carbon sequestered in function of different land uses and the reference at FADN database. In this approach there are many weaknesses linked at the uncertainty of effective quantity of carbon sequestered (that depending strictly from various site-specific parameters, which soil type and vegetation cover, cultivation practices exercised, topography, history of land use, microclimate), the data accuracy, the price vector of outputs, the different farmer's behavior, the livestock presence, etc.. However, this study is just a first survey of the impact at farm level, which shows some details of the proposed instrument of floor-and-trade that makes it attractive also in Italy in order to make more acceptable the transition of agricultural systems towards a greater degree of sustainability. Certainly the implications of the implementation design (threshold values, defined areas, aspects of redistribution, the impact on business costs, etc.) have to be studied more in depth. But it should be emphasized that the FT mechanism has been proposed by an organization close to the farmers, very active in seek win-win solutions that achieve environmental goals while assuring the income of farms and simplify administrative procedures (CLA, 2009) . In other words, these proposals should not be exclusive patrimony of environmental organizations, but may also find acceptance in agricultural sector (e.g. professional organizations), emphasizing the right size and convenience of environmental policies. There are still many aspects that need to be explored and which may serve as starting evidences for further study, so for example the possibility to analyze in advance the implications of these innovative mechanisms for public intervention. In Italy the current availability of data from statistical sources (FADN, ISTAT census and sample surveys) or from administrative sources is such that many studies may already be made.
